If an undergraduate writing an essay on Hindutva were to ignore the mass of material on the subject
and pronounce that 'ordinarily Hindutva is understood as a way of life or a state of mind and it is not
to be equated with or understood as religious Hindu fundamentalism', he would receive a deserved
and stinging rebuke. But the words quoted here were used by Justice J.S. Verma of the Supreme
Court in a shocking judgement which held that neither the Shiv Sena chief Bal Thackeray nor his
colleague ManoharJoshi violated Section 123(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951,
which penalizes appeals to the voter 'on the ground of religion."-'" Shockingly Justice Verma's
judgement on Hindutva ignored Savarkar's work on the subject. The judge equated Hindutva with
Hinduism in a laboured effort. Millions of devout Hindus despise Hindutva. Justice Verma is, of
course, entitled to differ with them. He has no right, however, to equate Hindutva with Hinduism in a
judicial pronouncement. That he went so far as to rule that 'the word "Hindutva" is used and
understood as a synonym of "Indianization"' - the Jan Sangh's slogan - reveals his outlook, especially
since these remarks were obiter and unnecessary for deciding the case. Justice Verma had
studiously refi-ained from pronotmcing secularism to be a 'basic feature' of the Constitution in the
S.R. Bommai case (1994) SCC. Hisjudgement in the Ayodhya case was just as flawed.

The BJP, understandingly, lauds his rulings as jucticial exoneration of its ideology of state. Few know
that the court as a whole did not share Justice Verma's view. The matter was referred to a larger
bench. It is unfortunate that the court has not found time to hear that reference. Justice Verma's ruling
is productive of grave public mischief and deserves to be reviewed and rejected.

The BJP's 1999 Manifesto dishonestly claimed that 'the Supreme Court, too, finally, endorsed the
true meaning and content of Hindutva as being consistent with the true meaning and definition of
secularism.' This is utterly false. The Court 's final ruling is yet to be given and the BJP knows this
very well, like every one else. On April 16, 1996 a three-member Bench of the Court, comprising
Justices K. Ramaswamy, S.P. Bharucha and K.S. Paripoornan referred to a larger Bench of five
judges the highly unsatisfactory judgement given by Justice J.S. Verma, on December 11, 1995, on
behalf of himself and Justices N.P. Singh and K. Venkataswami. It is, therefore, not a final ruling on
Hindutva.

The background is important. In an earlier case decided on July 14, 1995, by Justices G.N. Ray and
Faizan Uddin, the Supreme Court clearly said:

"It has been very strenuously contended by the learned council for the appellant that appeal to vote
for 'Hindutva' should not be confused with appeal to vote only for a member of one conmmnity
namely the Hindus. Criticism of partisan treatment meted out to the Hindus by the ruling Congress
party or appeasement policy in favour of one community or followers of a particular religion
impairing national integrity and appeal to oppose such improper and anti-national policy should not
be held to be an appeal to vote only on the basis of a particular religion. It has been contended that
the thrust of the speeches was that unequal treatment meted out to Hindus and deliberate hurting of
sentiments of Hindus have enconraged divisive forces aud anti-national elements in the country and
Hindus should be aware of such divisive and anti-national forces in selecting proper candidate who
would safeguard the unity and integrity of the country. Hindus should be aware of such divisive
forces and try to unite against such divisive and anti- national forces in selecting proper candidate
who would safeguard the unity and integrity of the country. In our view it is not necessary to consider
the philosophy of Hindu religion and its tenets of tolerance and respect for different religious faiths for
the purpose of appreciating whether appeal was really made for Hindutva which is something
different from outward practices and some of the following professed by followers of Hindu religion.
In the instant case we have already indicated that the appellant had given publicity to the voters by
exhibiting the poster Ext. 0-20 which was per se highly offensive and potentially vulnerable and was
likely to bring hatred and misunderstanding between the two communities, namely, the Hindus and
the Muslims. In our view, the poster containing an appeal to vote for the appellant 'to teach the
Muslims a lesson' cannot be justified in any manner even by giving reasonable latittudes in election
speeches.

The Appellant's election was set aside because of that poster.

That bench adopted an approach wholly opposite to the one over which Justice Verma presided. He
did not refer to this earlier case. Worse, he distorted a quote, omitting what it totally refuted his
thesis. The Supreme Conrt itself has ruled time and again that a precedent must be read in the
context of the facts of that particular case. Hinduism may be hard to define. Not so Hinclutva.
Unless, of course, one deliberately identifies it with Hinduism. Justice Verma did just that: 'Ordinarily,
Hindutva is understood as a way of life or a state of mind and it is not to be equated with or
understood as religious Hindn fimdamentalism'.

Did Justice Verma cite any authority in support of this weird conclusion? Yes, he did. The quotation
and his inference deserve to be set out in full.

In Indian Muslims - the Need for a Positive Outlook by Maulana Wahiduddin Khan (1994), it is
said: 'The strategy worked out to solve the minorities problem was, although different worded, tltat
of Hindutva or Indianization. This strategy, briefly stated, aims at developing a uniform culture by
obliterating the differences between all of the cultures coexisting in the country. This was felt to be
the way to communal harmony and national unity. It was thought that this would put an end once and
for all to the minorities problem.'

From this Justice Verma concluded, 'The above opinion indicates that the word "Hindutva" is used
and understood as a synonym of "Indianization", i.e. development of uniform culture by obliterating
the difference between all the cultures co-existing in the country.' Where was the need to pick on this
one obscure book? The Maulana is a polemicist. There are works by acadelnics which are truly
authoritative. In a judgement of this kind, surely such works ought to be quoted.

However, even if the Maulana is to be quoted, surely he must be quoted fairly and understood
properly. If one does that, one finds that far from supporting Justice Verma's conclusion, the
Maulana refutes it thoroughly. It was not in praise of Hindutva or its euphemism 'Indianization' that
the Maulana was writing, but in their censure. The paragraph preceding it lamented that Hindus did
not treat the Partition as 'just an incident in past history'. The subsequent strategy 'to solve the
minorities problem' through Hindutva or Indianization, sought to impose 'a uniform culture by
obliterating the differences between all of the cultures co-existing in the country'. Unlike Justice
Verma who quoted this to imply approval of this process, the Maulana disapproved of it. He is for
the co-existence of 'all of the cultures' in our diverse land. The BJP and the RSS are not. This
becomes all too clear from the very sentence after the Maulana's comment that it was thought that
the obliteration would end the minorities problem. That sentence reads: 'However beautiful this
suggestion may appear to be, it is certainly, impracticable' . Justice Verma did not note this sentence
at all.

As for 'Indianization', the Standing Committee of the NIC adopted a statement, on October 16,
1969, which said: 'We condemn the spread of the idea that any community requires to be
'Indianized.' An all-party conference was convened under its auspices on November 3, 1969, with
the Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, in the chair. It denounced Indianization. The Jan Sangh alone
opted out. Indianization was a subterfuge for Hindutva.

The reference to the larger bench, it must be noted, is not confined to the narrow issue of a
candidate's responsibility for the speeches of his party leaders. 'The content and scope' of the
relevant provision of Section 123 (3) and 3A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951
(penalizing communal propaganda) are also referred to the larger Bench 'lest miscarriage of justice in
interpretation of "corrupt practice"... would ensue' (p. 671, para 12). This Bench's disquiet at Justice
Verma's ruling is manifest.